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COMMENTS
Removal of Civil Rights Cases-Recent Developments
§ 1443. Civil Rights Cases
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to
the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in
the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any
law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on
the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.1
For eighty-five years the Supreme Court interpretation of section
1443 of the Judicial Code, providing for federal removal of cases
arising out of civil rights litigation, has remained unchanged. The
large bulk of Court cases "hold" that a cause is not removable under
the statute unless there is a state law or constitution that on its face
denies the equal civil rights of the defendant.2 However, the past
year has seen a series of decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Fifth Circuits3 that have reexamined and revitalized
this section, which had fallen into general disuse as a result of the
Supreme Court interpretation. This comment will analyze section
1443 in light of these decisions. In order to grasp the significance
'28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964).
'Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Smith v.
Misssisippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565
(1896); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 110 (1883); Neal v. Dela-
ware, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 370 (1881). The word "hold" is used here loosely,
since it is subject to question just what certain of the Court cases do hold.
See text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
'Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), petition
for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3073 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1965) (No. 471).
Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808
(1965); New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 977 (1965). Accord, City of Chester v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 823 (3d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3098 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1965)
(No. 443); Robinson v. Florida, 345 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1965); Board of
Educ. v. City-Wide Comm. for Integration of Schools, 342 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.
1965) (per curiam).
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of these cases a short resume of the history of the statute and a
summary of the more significant Supreme Court cases are neces-
sary.4
I. STATUTORY HISTORY
The source of the conflict as to the meaning of the statute is the
vague and ambiguous wording given to it by its original drafters
and those who recodified it into the Revised Statutes of 1875. In
seeking to determine the correctness of the interpretation recently
given section 1443, the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes must be
borne in mind: "The Legislature has the power to decide what the
policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed."'
Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,1 one of many recon-
struction statutes, provided that district and circuit courts had
original and concurrent jurisdiction
Of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied
or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State
or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them
by the first section of this act; and if any suit or prosecution,
civil or criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any state
court, against any such person, for any cause whatsoever, or
against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any
'For a more complete analysis of the topic see Amsterdam, Criminal
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal
and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 793 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]. Mr. Amsterdam's ex-
cellent article considers every facet of civil rights removal beginning with
the first Judiciary Act of 1789 and continuing through New York v. Galami-
son, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1965). Although this writer does not agree in
many respects with Mr. Amsterdam's analysis, his article should be con-
sulted by any advocate concerned with the civil rights removal problem.
'Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
6 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3,-14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the act
declared in part that
all persons born in the United States ... of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other. ...
Section 2 of the act made it a crime for any person "under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom" to deprive any person of any
right secured by the act. Sections 4-10 were devoted to compelling and
ensuring the arrest and prosecution of violators of § 2.
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arrest or imprisonment, trespass, or wrongs done or committed by
virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or the act
establishing a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees,
and all acts amendatory thereof, or for refusing to do any act
upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act, such
defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to
the proper district court in the manner prescribed by the "Act
relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in
certain cases .... "
Though the intended scope of this provision is uncertain-the perti-
nent legislative history materials being of little assistance-the broad
purpose was to repudiate the Dred Scott Case.7 The only history
of any merit is found in the floor debates.' Even though they lend
little to the interpretation of the act, they do cast serious doubts
on the correctness of the interpretation that was subsequently given
it by the Supreme Court, i.e., that removal was limited to a statute
unconstitutional on its face.' It cannot be denied that the 1866 act
was directed towards counteracting the black codes enacted by the
recently defeated Confederate states,"° but it is equally certain that
local discrimination," denial of justice through the courts,' 2 and
'Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
'The Senate bill, S.61, was introduced and managed by Senator Trumbull
who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee. For a complete index to
the floor proceedings as set forth in the Congressional Globe, see Amsterdam
811 n.78.
' See cases cited at note 2 supra.
10 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603, 1118, 1160, (1866).
The following remarks of Representative Cook are particularly illustrative.
Can any member here say that there is any probability, or any possi-
bility, that these States will secure him in those rights? They have
already spoken through their Legislatures; we know what they will
do; these acts, which have been set aside by the military commanders,
are the expressions of their will....
It is idle to say these [freedmen] will be protected by the states.
The sufficient and conclusive answer to that position I submit is,
that those states have already passed laws which would now virtually
reenslave them.
Id. at 1124. See generally, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FREEDOM
TO THE FREE 32-35 (1963).
Zi See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks
of Senator Trumbull), id. at 602-03 (remarks of Senator Lane).
11 Particularly indicative are the hearings before the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, established to investigate the status of the Negro in former
slave states where black code legislation had been enacted. These hearings
are relevant in determining the intent of the 39th Congress, for many of the
members of this committee led the fight for the enactment of the Civil
Rights Removal Act. The attitude of the Congress which enacted the 1866
[Vol. 44
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the discriminatory application of various state laws not unconstitu-
tional on their face was of deep concern to the Congress.' 3 One
illustration of this is reflected in the following statement of Senator
Lane of Indiana made during the floor debates:
[W]hy do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because
we fear and have reason to fear that the emancipated slaves
would not have their rights in the courts of the slave States. The
state courts already have jurisdiction of every single question we
propose to give to the courts of the United States. Why then
the necessity of passing the law? Simply because we fear the
execution of these laws if left to the state courts.' 4
Not only does the tenor of the debates upon the bill indicate a
broader scope than that given section 1443 by the Court, but the
language of the act itself demonstrates an intent to redress non-
statutory denials of federal constitutional rights. The original act
intended to secure to those "persons who are denied or cannot en-
force in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality
where they may be . . ." their federal rights. The reference to
locality indicates that something less than a statutory obstruction
would support removal. Moreover, the rights protected in the section
1 and specifically referred to in section 3, included "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens ... any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding."' 5 Use
of the words "proceedings" and "custom" are further evidence that
unconstutional statutes denying equal rights were not the only state
process that could result in a denial of federal guarantees."5 Yet
it was the use of ambiguous language that was partially responsible
act was molded in part by the committee hearings. Many of the witnesses
before the committee stated that the prejudice of Southern judges or juries
was the primary obstacle faced by Negroes in obtaining justice. See, e.g.,
Hearings Before The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 1273, pt. 3, at 37 (1866) (testimony of General Howard) ; id. at
62 (testimony of Mr. Stafford); id., pt. 4, at 75 (testimony of General
Custer) ; id., pt. 2, at 271 (testimony of Colonel Beadle); id., pt. 2, at 291(testimony of Major Lawrence).
" See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1123-24, 1151, 1759(1866).
"Id. at 602 (1866).
" See note 6 supra.
1 Senator Trumbull repeatedly told the Senate that the "denial" phrase
of § 3 was intended to allow removal in all cases where a custom or statute
of the state discriminated against the freedmen. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 475, 1759 (1866).
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for the narrow construction given the statute. There can be no
doubt that the 39th Congress knew how to use more explicit lan-
guage. In 1867 the diversity removal act was amended to permit
removal by a nonresident of a state upon allegations that he had
been denied justice due to prejudice or local influence. 17 Had Con-
gress intended to allow removal to state citizens (freedmen) under
such circumstances, why had it not used similar language?
The nine years following the enactment of the 1866 act resulted
in the adoption of three additional civil rights acts.18 Various sec-
tions of the 1866 act were incorporated into these acts.' 9 The first
major revision of section 3 took place with its codification into the
Revised Statutes of 1875 and 1878 as section 641.2" Though the
"'Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, which provides, in its
relevant part, that where there is diversity of citizenship and the amount
in dispute exceeds $500, the out-of-state citizen may remove if he files "an
affidavit stating that he has reason to and does believe that, from prejudice
or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State
court. . . ." This statute was a part of the Reconstruction legislation. It
was carried forward into the Revised Statutes § 639(3) (1875), and the
Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087. It was dropped from
the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The Reviser's Note states that
"these provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engendered by the
Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence
of a nation since united by three wars against foreign powers." Reviser's
Note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 at 2-3 (1950). The better explanation, however,
is that it had fallen into general disuse because of restrictions placed upon
its use.
'8 Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Civil Rights
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of March 1,
1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
1" See New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also Amsterdam 826-28.
Rav. STAT. § 641 (1875) provides:
When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any
State court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is
denied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in
the part of the State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any
right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights
of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, or against any officer, civil or military, or
other person, for any arrest or imprisonment or other trespasses or
wrongs, made or committed by virtue of or under color of authority
derived from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid, or for
refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law, such suit or prosecution may, upon the petition of such
defendant, filed in said State court at any time before the trial or
final hearing of the cause . . . be removed. . ..
Congress has periodically made a codification of the laws of the United
States for the sake of greater clarity and convenience. These codifications
seen in the Revised Statutes of 1875, the Judicial Code of 1911 and of 1948,
have been primarily mechanical and not substantive.
[Vol. 44
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revisers are said to have intended no alteration of meaning of the
civil rights removal section, 1 the changes in the language have made
interpretation even more difficult. Section 641 was brought forward
into section 31 of the Judicial Code of 1911, without any significant
change.22 The 1948 codification resulted in real alteration of the
language and structure, but the reviser's note disclaims any intent
to change the meaning. 3
It is appropriate to mention here that the 1866 statute was initial-
ly construed to give a right of removal because of local prejudice,
as it was intended to do.24 In State v. Dunlap25 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the act was intended to include "cases
where, by reason of prejudice in the community, a fair trial cannot
be had in the State courts.' 28 However, as the following cases
reveal, the Supreme Court subsequently gave section 1443 (1) the
narrowest of interpretations, and was never to construe section
1443(2).
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
A brief summary of the more significant Supreme Court cases
interpreting section 1443 (1) must suffice here. Strauder v. West
Virginia7 was the first case to reach the Court in which the civil
rights removal provision was construed. Strauder, a Negro indicted
for murder, sought removal on the ground that a state statute
barred members of his race from jury service. The West Virginia
court denied removal, and he was convicted. The Court reversed,
holding the state statute sufficient basis for removal under section
641 of the Revised Statutes (now section 1443). Strauder may be
taken to authorize removal only when a state statute is unconstitu-
tional. However, a more realistic interpretation would be that the
test of removability is whether the statute directs the federally un-
constitutional result complained of.2Y The Court has taken the
former view.
" See note 59 infra.
" Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096.
" H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 134 (1947).
2" State v. Dunlap, 65 N.C. 491 (1871); Gaines v. State, 39 Tex. 606
(1873). But see Fitzgerald v. Allman, 82 N.C. 492 (1880). The Gaines
decision was reversed in Texas v. Gaines, 23 Fed. Cas. 869 (No. 13,847)
(C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874).
2265 N.C. 491 (1871).26Id. at 495.
27100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880).
"Id. at 311-12.
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Virginia v. Rives," decided the same day, also involved an
allegation of exclusion of Negroes from the jury that tried and
convicted Negro defendants. 0 The defendants eventually succeeded,
by writ of habeas corpus, in being transferred to federal custody.
The state of Virginia moved for a rule to show cause why a manda-
mus compelling remand should not issue. The Supreme Court
granted the writ of mandamus to the state. After noting that section
641 (section 1443) rested on the fourteenth amendment, the Court
pointed out that unconstitutional action by state officers was not
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. The Court then
held that the removal of cases under section 641 did not apply to
all cases in which a defendant might be denied equal protection.
Because the removal petition had to be filed before trial, the Court
felt that the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress (1866) had
intended that no "judicial infraction of the constitutional inhibitions,
after trial or final hearing has commenced"'" would justify re-
moval. To justify removal there must be a factual showing that
the defendant cannot enforce his federal rights. This inability to
enforce set out in section 641 "is primarily, if not exclusively, a
denial of such rights, or an inability to enforce them, resulting from
the Constitution or laws of the State, rather than a denial first
made manifest at the trial of the case. In other words, the statute
has reference to a legislative denial or an inability resulting from
it."32
Rives can be interpreted to mean no more than that the allega-
tions of discrimination by the defendant were insufficient, and the
reference to legislation may be taken to be nothing other than an
example of what is a sufficient allegation that will support removal.
Or it can be interpreted narrowly to mean that a statute or constitu-
tional provision must, on its face, deny defendant his rights. The
latter was the construction adopted by the Court3 in Neal v. Dela-
100 U.S. (10 Otto) 313 (1880).
0 Petitioners also alleged a strong community prejudice against them
because of their race therefore inability to obtain an impartial trial and that
no Negro had ever served on a jury in which a member of their race had
an interest.
a' 100 U.S. at 319.
"Id. at 319-20.
"The same day the Court handed down its opinions in Strauder and
Rives, it decided Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1880). Here
a state judge had been indicted under § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336, for exclusion of Negroes from jury service. Petition
[Vol. 44
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ware. 4 The defendant Negro, as in Rives, sought removal on the
ground that Negroes were systematically excluded from state juries
by a 1831 provision of the Delaware Constitution. The Supreme
Court, by means of direct review,35 reversed Neal's conviction, but
as far as removal was concerned, denied the petition. The defendant
had failed to allege facts that demonstrated that any civil right had
been denied. As to whether section 641 would support removal in
light of the Delaware constitutional provision, the Court reasoned
that since the fourteenth amendment rendered that provision void,
the jury commissioners or other subordinate officers had acted
"without authority derived from the constitution and laws of the
State"36 in which case Congress had not authorized removal. Had
the discriminatory legislation been adopted after the enactment of
the fourteenth amendment as in Strauder, or had the state court
repudiated that amendment, there would have been grounds for re-
moval. But here the legislation had been in effect prior to the
amendment.
The Neal opinion did suggest that removal might be justified if
judicial action by the highest state tribunals resulted in denial of
for writ of habeas corpus was based on the theory that the fourteenth
amendment applied only to the states, and action by an individual was not
"state action." The Court rejected this saying acts done under color of
state authority were within the statute. Ex parte Virginia reveals that the
Court was willing to go beyond state law and to intervene in the jury
selection process if unlawful. This case disposes of any contention that
Rives may have narrowly construed § 641 because of some constitutional
difficulty, or because the Reconstruction legislation was only the result of
bitter hatred and should be curtailed. If either contention was the reason
for the Rives construction of § 641, certainly such reservations would have
applied, at least equally, in Ex parte Virginia.
3' 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 370 (1881).
"Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386. The current statutory
provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
"' The only way to overcome this presumption that the state courts would
adhere to the federal constitution would be by a showing of clear state
action disregarding the Constitution. An example of such state action was
not only "the Constitution or laws of the State, as expounded by the highestjudicial tribunal," 103 U.S. (13 Otto) at 393, but also judicial action of
the state.
[H]ad its judicial tribunals, by their decisions, repudiated that [four-
teenth] amendment as a part of the supreme law of the land, or
declared the acts passed to enforce its provisions to be inoperative and
void, there would have been just ground to hold that there was such
a denial, upon its part, of equal civil rights, or such an inability to
enforce them in those tribunals, as, under the Constitution and within
the meaning of that section [641], would authorize a removal of the
suit or prosectuion to the Circuit Court of the United States.
Id. at 392.
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equal civil rights.3 But even stare decisis as a basis for removal
was lost in Kentucky v. Powers,ss decided in 1906, the most recent
and constrictive Supreme Court case construing section 1443(1).
Powers, the Republican candidate for the office of Secretary of
State of Kentucky in a bitterly contested election, was charged with
the murder of the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for governor.
His victorious Republican running mate, now governor, pardoned
him. The local law enforcement officials and judges, all Democrats,
were alleged to have connived in the selection of the juries that
tried him, so as to exclude all Republicans. Powers was tried and
convicted three times, on each occasion objecting to the discrimina-
tion in jury selection and pleading his pardon as a defense. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals had reversed his conviction each time,
but because of a Kentucky statute, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky held that it was without power to upset the trial judge's ruling
as to the jurors-thus the court's rulings were the law of the case
and as binding as a statute. Clearly, if stare decisis was a ground
for removal, section 641 was applicable. The lower federal court
sustained removal on this ground.39
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, held removal un-
available and ordered the case remanded to the Kentucky state court.
It is not contended, as it could not be, that the constitution and
laws of Kentucky deny to the accused any rights secured to him
by the Constitution of the United States or by any act of Con-
gress. Such being the case, it is impossible, in view of prior
adjudications, to hold that this prosecution was removable into
the Circuit Court of the United States by virtue of Section 641
of the Revised Statutes.4"
Because the removal section requires the petition for removal to be
filed before trial, the Court continued, the petitioner must allege and
prove before going to court that his equal civil rights will be denied
by the court once he reaches the trial stage. The Powers opinion
presumed that state courts would apply the laws of the state indis-
criminately.41 Accordingly, the Court seems to have held that the
a7 Ibid.
's201 U.S. 1 (1906).
o' Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452, 487 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd,
201 U.S. 1 (1906).10 201 U.S. at 35.
"1 Mr. Amsterdam points out that this presumption is untenable since
it is based on the assumption that state judges will not be hostile to federal
[Vol. 44
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only justification for removal prior to trial is a showing that a
state statute or constitutional provision was invalid on its face. As
a result of the Rives-Powers doctrine, until 1965 federal courts had
been unanimous in holding that removal was possible under section
1443 (1) only when petitioner could show that a state statute or
constitution, invalid on its face, denied him a federally protected
right. 2 The absence, since 1906, of Supreme Court decisions con-
struing the civil rights removal statute is due not only to the narrow
construction apparently given it in Powers, but also the statutory
provision of 1887, carried forward into the Judicial Code of 1948,
exempting from review all orders of remand by federal districts
courts.
III. T19E RECENT DECISIONS
The increase in court decisions involving removal under section
1443 is the immediate result of a 1964 amendment to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d) . 3 Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
when a case, removed pursuant to section 1443, is ordered remanded
to the state court, that order "shall be reviewable by appeal or other-
wise."4 4 The purpose of the amendment, revealed by legislative his-
tory, is to extend the right of removal to those defendants who
demonstrate an inability to secure their federally protected rights
because of local prejudice, "or for any reason involving the un-
rights unless so directed by state statute, "or that no form of proof except
positive law will sustain a relatively sure prediction of judicial conduct."
Such assumptions defeat the purpose of the removal provision for this is
where removal is least needed. Where a state court upholds a statute or
constitutional provision that is unconstitutional on its face, there exists,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Amsterdam 857. It is strange that Mr. Amsterdam should make this
argument. One of soundest arguments made for giving § 1443 the scope it
deserves is to end the use of harassing court actions to defeat civil rights
movements. Under § 1257(2) appeal is possible only from a finml state
court decision. The relief granted by § 1257(2) is definitely not nearly so
great as is suggested.
"' E.g., Eubanks v. Florida, 242 F. Supp. 472 (1965); Louisiana v. Tyson,
241 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. La. 1963); City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 237 F.
Supp. 213 (N.D. Miss. 1964); Maryland v. Kurek, 233 F. Supp. 431 (D.
Md. 1964); Alabama v. Shine, 233 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. Ala. 1964); North
Carolina v. Alston, 227 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1964); Anderson v. Tennes-
see, 228 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); City of Birmingham v. Croskey,
217 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ala. 1963); In re Hagewood, 200 F. Supp. 140
(E.D. Mich. 1961); Rand v. Arkansas, 191 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1961);
Texas v. Dorris, 165 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1958).
" See Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965). Rachel illustrates
the ease with which cases are removable under this amendment.
"Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 901, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964).
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constitutional application of state laws. The legislative history also
calls specifically for the courts to redetermine the scope of the right
to remove under section 1443."" 5 This call was speedily answered,
as the following cases reveal.
Chronologically, the first of these court of appeals opinions was
New York v. Galarnison.41 Petitioner and fifty others were attempt-
ing removal of prosecutions under a variety of state charges arising
out of car and subway stall-ins, sit-ins, and schoolyard leafleting to
protest racial discrimination. Petitioners relied solely on section
1443(2), for if it were given the interpretation they sought, there
would not have to be a showing of denial or inability to enforce
rights-an impossible task for these defendants 4 -- as under section
1443(1). Removal was sought on the ground that the prosecutions
arose out of acts
of protest and resistance [which] were "under color of author-
ity" of one or more of three "law[s] providing for equal rights"
-the guarantees of free speech and petition embodied in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protec-
tion clause of that Amendment, and statutory protection con-
ferred by the constitution, notably 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.4s
Alternatively the petitioner contended that his resistance to "police
commands was 'on the ground that it would be inconsistent with'
same three sets of laws."4 Judge Friendly, writing the majority
"43 N.C.L. REv. 628, 635-36 (1965).
It is particularly important, it seems to me, that the right to a fair
trial free from racial hostility and antagonism should be guaranteed.
This is what the Congress of 1866 tried to do. This is what the
removal statute will do if properly construed.
It is the purpose of title IX to make it possible for the courts to
consider whether the removal statute can be given such construction.
110 CONG. REc. 6955 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dodd). See also id. at
6551 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
-6342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1965).
,' Petitioners made no allegations of discriminatory application of the
statutes under which they were prosecuted. Mr. Amsterdam stated that no
allegations were made because they could not be proved, but there is dis-
crimination between privileged and underprivileged groups. "[E]nforcement
discrimination is unprovable because the privileged groups do not (and do
not have to) engage in the protest demonstrations in which the under-
privileged groups engage." Amsterdam 865 n.274. Carrying this reasoning
one step further the result would necessarily be the abolishment of all state
court jurisdiction over matters involving civil rights. This writer views the
petition for removal in Galamison as an effort by diligent counsel to expend
every remedy possible in avoiding a final decision.
" 342 F.2d at 258.
,Ibid.
[Vol. 44
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opinion, rejected both of these contentions, holding that neither the
equal protection nor due process clauses of the amendment nor the
statutes gave color of authority to protest against discrimination.
More significantly, the court stated:
When the removal statute speaks of "any law providing for
equal rights," it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of
equality, such as the historic and recent equal rights statutes, as
distinguished from laws, of which the due process clause and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer equal rights in
the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all.50
Galamison is particularly significant for the construction it has
given two of the most troublesome phrases of the statute. These
phrases are "act under color of authority" and, "any law providing
for equal [civil] rights." The latter phrase is found in both sub-
sections (1) and (2) and has identical meaning in both.51 A num-
ber of constructions can be given to "equal civil rights,"5' 2 but the
petitioners in Galamison contended that reference was either to
statutes and constitutional amendments protecting all civil rights, or
to statutes such as the civil rights acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871 and
the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth amendments. The court rejected
the former construction for the reason that the utilization of the
word "equal" would be completely redundant and, as to the latter,
excluded the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now section 1983 of title
forty-two, 3 for the same reason. 4 Since first amendment rights were
in issue, the petitioner's case depended upon inclusion of section 1983
" Id. at 271.
" Section 641, set out in note 20 supra, granted removal to any person
who could not enforce in state courts "any right secured to him by any law
providing for the equal rights of citizens of the United States" and to
officers or other persons charged with wrongs done under "color of authority
derived from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid." In § 31 of
the 1911 Judicial Code the "color of authority" passage, as in § 641, referred
back to the "aforesaid" laws of the first part of the act. Omission of "afore-
said" in the 1948 revision effected no substantive change according to the
reviser's notes. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 134 (1947).
But see, New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1965).
See Amsterdam 866.
Rsv. STAT. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
"Appellants say that since the rights of freedom of speech and of
petition are guaranteed to all and not just to some, they also are
"equal" civil rights. But this truism, which is the strength of the argu-
ment, is also its weakness. What is so obvious to appellants must have
been just as obvious to Congress, and "equal" would thus have been
surplusage.
242 F.2d at 268.
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within the meaning of "equal civil rights." An action under section
1983 encompasses "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the constitution and laws," 5 i.e., due process as well as equal protec-
tion claims. 56 The argument has recently been made that the authors
of the Revised Statutes of 1875, in rewriting section 3 of the 1866
act, intended, by adding the word "equal" to the term "rights," to
include thereby all statutes having an equalitarian purpose.F Such
an interpretation would result in the inclusion of section 1983. As
seen above, Judge Friendly held that reference was only "to those
laws that are couched in terms of equality,"' 8 and that section 1983
was not a law providing for equal civil rights within the meaning
of section 1443. The court pointed out that such an inclusion would
have expanded the original act significantly (to say the least), some-
thing the Congress specifically expressed an intent that the revision
was not to do.5" Moreover, the court visualized the practical effect
of allowing any first amendment or due process claims to be re-
moved under either section of the statute. Trying to limit such
" Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). The origin of this
statute is the third civil rights act, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13, which had adopted the remedial provisions of the first civil rights
act of 1866. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" The term due process, as used herein, includes concepts of procedural
fairness, e.g., notice, hearing, confrontation, impartial tribunal and the like.
Ibid. Note that § 1983, supra note 55, also protects first amendment rights,
eg., the right to picket, parade, distribute leaflets and the like. See, e.g.,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Equal protection claims, as used
herein, contemplate fourteenth amendment rights to equal treatment without
invidious discrimination.W Amsterdam 871-73. Mr. Amsterdam contends that "equal civil rights"
refers "to statutes (and/or constitutional provisions) whose purpose was
to protect the Negro and assure him in his civil rights, whether or not
the statute (or constitutional provision) speaks explicitly in terms of equal-
ity." Id. at 866.
342 F.2d at 271.
It would be a flight of fancy to attribute, on the basis of a readily
explicable change in wording, such an undisclosed purpose to a Con-
gress which was aiming only to "revise, simplify, codify, arrange, and
consolidate" existing statutes, and was so intent on avoiding sub-
stantive alterations that it designated a lawyer for the purpose of
eradicating any such changes made by the codifying commission.
Id. at 267-68.
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claims to civil rights demonstrators would be a "formidable" burden
upon the courts, and drawing the line to one class of action or
people would be all but impossible. ° Obviously the Thirty-ninth
Congress (1866) did not intend to include due process claims within
section 3, since the fourteenth amendment was passed after the
initial approval of the act. It is equally doubtful that the authors of
the Revised Statutes of -1875 meant to incorporate section 1983
(which would permit due process claims), into the removal section.
This is so not only for the reasons suggested by Judge Friendly
but also because the right given by that section is the right to
maintain a civil action, and when taken in context with the re-
mainder of section 1443(2), it is difficult to see what "color of
authority" section 1983 lends to conduct in the exercise of first
amendment rights.61
Although Galamison correctly held that a claim arising under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not removable
under the statute, substantial difficulty may arise out of the court's
holding that section 1443(1) applies to rights under the equal pro-
tection clause.62 The following statement from the dissent readily
discloses the danger of speaking in terms of equal protection:
" Id. at 270. Judge Marshall, dissenting, stated that the majorities' fears
were not well founded and that a "limiting principal could perhaps be found"
that would permit use of the due process clause only where there was an
alleged denial of substantive equal protection. Id. at 280. Judge Friendly
makes short order of his fellow judge's argument: "But the guarantee of
liberty in the due process clause either is or is not a law providing for
equal rights within the removal statute, and if it gives 'color of authority'
for one type of protest, it does so for all." Id. at 270.
"
1It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Strauder, only five years
after enactment of the Revised Statutes, made this explicit statement: "This
act plainly has reference to sect. 1977 and 1978 of the statutes which partially
enumerate the rights and immunities intended to be guaranteed by the
Constitution.... ." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 311
(1880). (Emphasis added.) Clearly the Court that held the removal statute
constitutional and upheld its application considered § 1979 (42 U.S.C. §
1983) not a law providing for "equal civil rights" within the meaning of§ 641. But see, 342 F.2d at 281 n.7 (dissenting opinion).
82 Galamison stated that "equal civil rights" in subsection (1) includes
rights arising under both the equal protection clause and equalitarian statutes,
but that the phrase "equal rights" in subsection (2) includes only equalitarian
statutes. There is little foundation for saying that these tvo phrases are
not of identical meaning. See note 51 supra. It is submitted that "laws
providing for equal civil rights" means only statutory enactments and not
constitutional provisions. As pointed out in note 61 supra, Strader made
it clear that "this act plainly has reference to sects. 1977 [42 U.S.C. § 1981]
and 1978 [42 U.S.C. § 1982] of the statutes.. . ." Mr. Amsterdam points
out that prior to the Revised Statutes, "removal jurisdiction had been used
19661
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We should approach the problems inherent in some of these peti-
tions, not by severing and separately compartmentalizing the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, but realizing that they
are both part of the same constitutional amendment, undoubtedly
the most basic of all laws providing for equal rights, and that
these clauses often intersect.
03
That the two clauses of the amendment do intersect, 4 and that a
due process claim can be drafted to present equal protection claims
is clear.0 5 Utmost caution must be exercised by federal courts in
processing removal petitions so long as equal protection claims are
a basis for removal.
The Galamison decision is the first federal appellate court opin-
ion to rule on the question of what constitutes "color of authority."66
The majority-assuming only for argumentive purposes that section
1443 (2) was not limited to officers or those acting in their behalf-
held that neither the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment nor section 1981 of title forty-two, 7 a statute "couched in
equalitarian terms," gave authority to do the acts in question. The
court stated that the legislature must have manifested an intention
that the beneficiary do something. A law providing a citizen with
only a defense to a prosecution or a law granting the power to have
civil or criminal liability imposed on those interfering with him is
insufficient."8 In support of this conclusion the court correctly
pointed out that to hold otherwise would be to deprive section
1443(1) of all effect, i.e., "the requirement of showing denial or
inability to enforce [a right] would be avoided by resort to
[1443(2)]. " 69 The contrary argument is that the first section ap-
plies to deprivations of rights in state trial procedure, whereas sub-
section (2) "isolates and separately treats cases involving substantive
exclusively to implement specific congressional programs," and there was
no reason for the revisers to go beyond this use. It may be argued that
the equal protection clause is a substantive civil rights provision to which
the removal statute is an adjunct. See Rachel v. State, 342 F.2d 336, 342
(5th Cir. 1965).
342 F.2d at 280.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Hornsby v. Allen, 326
F.2d 605 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
" Only two reported district court decisions have dealt with this section.
City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 237 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Miss. 1964); Arkansas
v. Howard, 218 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
" REv. STAT. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
a 342 F.2d at 264.
"0 Jbid.
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federal claims."7 It is said that the Thirty-ninth Congress recog-
nized that where substantive rights were involved, the need for
immediate federal jurisdiction was imperative, and by means of
subsection (2) made this possible.71 This interpretation would merit
consideration were it not for the fact that this section clearly applies
only to officers or those acting in behalf of officers.72 When this
is realized, the word "acts" found in subsection (2) no longer
denotes substantive claims but the acts of officers or those acting
on behalf of officers.
The majority in Galamison expressly declined to decide whether
section 1443(2) covered only officers or those assisting them, but
there is evidence that Judge Friendly felt it limited to this category.7"
Persons exercising color of authority under subsection (2) might
be (a) only federal officers enforcing equal civil rights, or (b)
federal officers and those authorized to assist them, or (c) the pre-
ceding class and all persons exercising privileges or immunities
under such law.74 An examination of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
leads to the conclusion that alternative (b) is the correct interpreta-
tion. Section 3 permitted removal of suits "against any officer,
civil or military, or other person. . . ." Alternative (a) is obviously
inapplicable due to the "officer ... or other person" formula. Those
who favor (c) put much emphasis on this phrase as demonstrating
that the section was not so limited as is here suggested. Logically,
the phrase "other persons" refers to those persons who, under sec-
tion 5 of the original act, were appointed by United States com-
missioners to aid in the enforcement of the act, and these persons
were also authorized to call bystanders or the posse comitatis to
their aid. 5 Galamison also correctly pointed out that "since the
first clause was directed only towards freedman's rights, symmetry
would suggest that the second clause concerned only acts of enforce-
ment."7 Supporting this is the fact that removal was permitted
where there had been an "arrest or imprisonment, trespass, or
wrongs done . . . under color of authority"-the type of charges
that would be brought against officers and those assisting them.
7oAmsterdam 877.
1 Ibid.
See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra.
342 F.2d at 262-63.
" Amsterdam 875.
"Act of April 19, 1866, ch. 31 § 5, 14 Stat. 28.
78 342 F.2d at 262.
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An even more persuasive reason for limiting removal to alterna-
tive (b) is that section 3 of the 1866 act provided that removal
was to be carried out "in the manner prescribed by the 'Act relating
to habeas corpus . . . ., , The habeas corpus act of 1863 referred
to also used the phrase "any other person," which in that context
meant someone deputized by the President or Congress to do some-
thing.78 Finally, it is asserted that giving section 1443(2) the nar-
row construction (b), results in redundancy with the officer removal
statute, section 1442. 79 Subsection (2) must therefore, go further.80
This assertion might be quickly dispatched by pointing out
that subsection (2) was an innovation, whereas extension of federal
officer removal came nearly a century later and could hardly be said
to enlarge the former. However, the better rebuttal is that section
1443 (2) does provide additional protection to federal officers. Under
1442(1) officers are allowed removal only for acts done under
"color of such office." If acts done under color of a specific office
were as broad as "acts done under color of authority derived from
federal law" the remainder of section 1442 would itself suffer from
redundancy."'
Whereas the Second Circuit in Galamison deemed it unnecessary
to decide if the right of removal under subsection (2) is limited
77 See statute set out in text accompanying note 6 supra.
"8 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 756 (1863). See
Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869).
7028 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964) reads in part:
(a) a civil action or a criminal prosecution commenced in a State
court against...
(1) any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on
account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of
Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the
collection of the revenue ... [may be removed.]
The remaining three subsections of § 1442(a) are concerned with removal
by (2) a property holder who derives title from such a federal officer,
(3) any officer of the U.S. courts, for any act done under color of office or
in performance of his duties, (4) any officer of Congress for an act done
in discharge of his duties. Prior to the 1948 revision the corresponding
provision of the code had covered only civil suits or criminal proceedings
against officers or other persons acting under the revenue laws. Judicial
Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 33, 36 Stat. 1097.
"0Amsterdam 878.
"This argument is more fully developed in a book prepared by Berl I.
Bernhard and Ronald B. Natalie, Director and Associate Director respective-
ly of the Special Committee on Civil Rights Under the Law of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York. This book, to be published in
1966, deals with removal, habeas corpus, and equitable remedies, and recom-
mends legislative changes in certain of these areas.
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to federal officers and quasi-officers, a recent opinion by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has expressly held it is so limited.
In Peacock v. City of Greenwood,2 discussed more fully below,
removal was sought under both sections of section 1443. In re-
sponse to the allegation that the acts committed by petitioners were
done under color of authority, the court held that "the original
language and context of § 1443(2) compel the conclusion that
the section is limited to federal officers and those assisting them or
otherwise acting in an official or quasi-official capacity. 8 s3 It is
the majority of the factors discussed above that led the court to
this conclusion.
Although it is apparent that subsection (2) was originally in-
tended to apply only to federal officers and those assisting them,
the recent case of Haem v. City of Rock Hills4 extended removal
under this section to persons engaged in wholly unofficial conduct.8 5
In Hamm, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dis-
missed the charges against civil rights demonstrators who were tried
under a South Carolina anti-trespass statute. The Court stated that
section 203(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 immunized from
prosecution persons seeking to gain admittance to establishments
covered by the act, so long as denial of service or request to leave
the premises was based on an intent to discriminate.8 ' In light of
Hamm Judge Friendly recognized in Galamison that Congress may
have authorized self-help to enforce certain rights under the 1964
Act.8 7 However, to hold such is not inconsistent with the intention
of the original act. Here an express act of Congress does in fact
give particular individuals under specified conditions "authority" to
engage in certain conduct.
Subsection (1) of section 1443 grants the right of removal "to
any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the [state] courts"
his federally protected rights. The main purpose of this section
82 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965).8 I1d., at 686. Accord, City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 237 F. Supp. 213
(N.D. Miss. 1964).8,379 U.S. 306 (1964).
8 The court in Peacock v. City of Greenwood failed to take account of
the Hamnm decision and its effect on § 1443(2). That it would agree to
this extension seems likely since the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had recognized § 1443 as an adjunct to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See note
102 infra.88 379 U.S. at 311.
87 342 F.2d at 265.
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was and is now to ensure protection of the rights of members of
the Negro race. This was the intention of the Congress that en-
acted the statute s and also the intent of the 1964 Congress that
amended section 1447(d) in an attempt to give it renewed vitality. 9
When a Negro is denied a constitutional right he is, at least sup-
posedly, provided a state forum in which to protect this right.
However, when this same forum is used by local and state officials
as a device to deny these statutory and constitutional rights,91 the
alternative is either to seek federal court protection or to turn to
the streets. 2 To ensure that a federal forum is available when this
and other situations arise, Congress has provided various means of
placing jurisdiction in federal hands, i.e., the writ of habeas corpus,93
equitable injunction of state prosecutions,94 and removal under sec-
tion 1443(1). But because of Supreme Court interpretations, the
successful use of any of these remedies has become almost impossi-
ble. Habeas corpus suffers from the exhaustion requirement,95 in-
junction from the abstention rule,"8 and removal from the Rives-
88 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., 475, 602, 1366 (1866). See
generally RANDAL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 734-35 (1953);
HICK & MowREY, A SHORT HISTORY OF AmERICAN DEMOCRACY 339 (2d ed.1956).19 See generally U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 287 (1964).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI & VII.
See for example the protracted litigation involving the Rev. Mr. Fred
Shuttlesworth in which five years and nineteen separate appearances in
federal and state courts were required to vindicate federally guaranteed
rights. For a brief summary of the Shuttlesworth litigation see 9 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 107 (1964); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 422 (1963); 7 RACE REL. L. REP.
114 (1963).
2 (a) Those who claim new rights can be induced to resort to the
courts and legislatures rather than the streets only if they believe no
delays will occur that are not reasonably necessary to the effective
operation of our lawmaking system. And (b) if those claimants are
to wait until the lawmaking process is complete before receiving full
judicial protection of their interests, they must have confidence that
they need not wait longer than that. In short, there must be an objec-
tively determined end to the process, as well as something worth
waiting for when the end is reached.
Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Court: A Problem in Nullifi-
cation, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1163, 1166 (1963).
"28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948).
,REv. STAT. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
"Ex parte Royal, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Royal holds that federal habeas
corpus cannot be exercised until a state prisoner has exhausted his available
state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). But see Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962).
" See e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S.
341 (1951); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943);
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v.
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Powers doctrine. Recognizing the dilemma faced by citizens in
various parts of its own circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has taken the initiative and by means of section 1443(1)
sought to provide speedy access to the federal forum. Faced with
the Rives-Powers doctrine this was no easy task.
Rachel v. Georgia7 involved the prosecution of twenty persons
under a Georgia anti-trespass statute. Petition for removal was
denied by the district court. The court of appeals granted removal
and reversed the prosecutions on the basis of section 1443 (1) and
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill."' The court held that the allegations of
the removal petition of discriminatory application of the statute were
sufficient to support removal to a federal forum. Moreover, suffi-
cient without the necessity of showing that the state courts of
Georgia would not entertain petitioner's claim of unconstitutional
application of the statute. The Power's requirement that a state
statute be unconstitutional on its face was evaded by the court.9'
Instead the court cited Rives as authorizing removal where "the
denial of protected rights be made to appear in the advance of
trial."' 00 Since the petitioners did allege that federally protected
rights were denied by state legislation the requirement of removal
stated in Rives was satisfied. The court of appeals had, in other
words, adopted the realistic interpretation possible in Rives that the
Supreme Court had refused to recognize.' Unwilling to put all its
Pullman, Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). But see, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
" 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965). Accord, Robinson v. Florida, 345 F.2d
133 (5th Cir. 1965).
" The court, upon reversing, remanded the case to the district court for
a hearing upon the validity of the allegations of the removal petition. The
court directed the action be dismissed on the basis of Hamn if it was estab-
lished that petitioners were removed from the places of public accommoda-
tion for racial reasons. Judge Bell dissented due to this latter direction. He
states that in not requiring petitioners to prove that the Georgia courts will
refuse to follow Hamm, "the theory of the majority must be that Hamm
has tainted these prosecutions ab initio, and hence jurisdiction in the federal
court has been established retroactively by the very fact the prosecutions
were ever commenced." 342 F.2d at 344.
" The majority states only that it has been argued that the Supreme
Court would today recognize the right to removal under subsection (1)
where no legislative denial of rights is shown. This interpretation in the
court's opinion would "reemphasize the putative essence of Virginia v.
Rives-that the denial of equal rights must be susceptible of demonstration
before trial . . . ." Id. at 339. No attempt is made to distinguish the Powers
case.
100 342 F.2d at 339.
... See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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eggs in one basket, the court turned to the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and Hamm. Like Galamison, Rachel held that the civil rights re-
moval statute is an adjunct to the 1964 act.0" Title II of that act
prohibits punishment of any persons exercising or attempting to
exercise any right guaranteed under that title. Petitioner's allega-
tion that a state statute was being used to deny federal rights, ac-
cording to the interpretation of Title II in Harm, justified removal
or dismissal. Thus Rachel allowed removal based only on the alleged
application of a state statute contrary to an act of Congress.
What hesitation the Fifth Circuit had shown in Rachel regard-
ing the requirements for removal established in the Rives-Powers
doctrine was met head on in Peacock v. City of Greenwood."3
Petitioners, engaged in a voter registration drive, were prosecuted
for obstructing a public street in violation of a Mississippi statute.
As in Rachel, the petition for removal was denied by the district
court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded, citing Rachel, which the court construed as holding that
"1443(1) allows removal where a state statute, though valid and
nondiscriminatory on its face, is applied in violation of some equal
right of the accused."' 04 In adhering to the holding of Rachel the
court also adopted the Galamison ruling that the equal protection
clause is a "law providing for equal civil rights" within the meaning
of subsection (1). However, the due process clause does not fall
within the statute.105 The court then addressed itself to determining
what a petitioner must show to demonstrate that he "is denied or
cannot enforce" his equal civil rights. After recognizing the Rives-
Powers doctrine (that a state statute be unconstitutional on its face)
and reviewing those decisions the court concluded:
We do not read these cases as establishing that the denial of equal
civil rights must appear on the face of the state constitution or
statute rather than in its application where the alleged denial of
rights, as here, had its inception in the arrest and charge. They
dealt only with the systematic exclusion question, a question
which in turn goes to the very heart of the state judicial process,
o 342 F.2d at 342. "It cannot be doubted that § 1443 (1) is today an
adjunct of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Rachel cited legislative history of
the 1964 act demonstrating that the 88th Congress also regarded the removal
statute as an adjunct for substantive civil rights statutes.10 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965).
1
, Id. at 681.
"' Accord, City of Chester v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 823, 824 (2d Cir. 1965)
on rehearing.
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and federalism may have indicated that the remedy in such situa-
tions in the first instance should be left to the state courts.1 00
In short, all petitions presented to the Supreme Court involved a
question of unconstitutional trial procedure. Never had the Court
been presented with an allegation that a substantive criminal statute
on which the prosecution was based was invalid, whether on its face
or by application, because of federal limitation. A petitioner, such
as Peacock, who attacks the underlying criminal charge does not
base his action on unconstitutional trial procedure, but on the fact
that if convicted at all under the particular state statute such con-
viction will be illegal.1" 7 Thus, in the instant case, the court held
that petitioner's allegation of application of a state statute contrary
to the equal protection clause would support removal.
It is submitted that the distinction drawn in Peacock and Rachel
between unconstitutional trial procedure and unconstitutional appli-
cation of a state statute is valid. This distinction gathers support
not only from the original statute and legislative history but also
from the Supreme Court cases. Strauder and Rives, literally con-
strued, pronounce that the existence of an unconstitutional state
statute demonstrates a denial of a protected right, not that such a
statute is a necessary prerequisite to removal. Strauder in fact holds
that the basis for removal is the likelihood that state courts will
ignore those federal rights protected by section 1443 (1), i.e., those
laws couched in egalitarian terms.
These two circuit court decisions give to the Negro a long-
awaited and greatly needed access to the federal court. But they
do more than just revitalize section 1443 (1), for they make removal
possible on the basis of no more than "bear-bones allegation" of
the existence of a right of removal. 0 8 This broad statement is
qualified by the requirements of federal pleading rules requiring
108 347 F.2d at 684.
"07 Amsterdam 853.
'08 Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336, 340 (1965). In Rachel the pertinent
portion of the removal petition alleged that(4) The petitioners are denied and/or cannot enforce in the Courts
of the State of Georgia rights under the Constitution and Laws of
the United States providing for the equal rights of citizens of the
United States and all persons within the jurisdiction thereof, in that,
among other things, the State of Georgia by statute, custom, usage,
and practice supports and maintains a policy of racial discrimination.
Id. at 339. These allegations were held sufficient to support removal to the
district court.
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